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Abstract—We consider power line outages in the transmission
system of the power grid, and specifically those caused by
a natural disaster or a large scale physical attack. In the
transmission system, an outage of a line may lead to overload
on other lines, thereby eventually leading to their outage. While
such cascading failures have been studied before, our focus is
on cascading failures that follow an outage of several lines in
the same geographical area. We provide an analytical model
of such failures, investigate the model’s properties, and show
that it differs from other models used to analyze cascades in
the power grid (e.g., epidemic/percolation-based models). We
then show how to identify the most vulnerable locations in the
grid and perform extensive numerical experiments with real grid
data to investigate the various effects of geographically correlated
outages and the resulting cascades. These results allow us to
gain insights into the relationships between various parameters
and performance metrics, such as the size of the original event,
the final number of connected components, and the fraction of
demand (load) satisfied after the cascade. In particular, we focus
on the timing and nature of optimal control actions used to reduce
the impact of a cascade, in real time. We also compare results
obtained by our model to the results of a real cascade that
occurred during a major blackout in the San Diego area on
Sept. 2011. The analysis and results presented in this paper
will have implications both on the design of new power grids
and on identifying the locations for shielding, strengthening, and
monitoring efforts in grid upgrades.
Index Terms—Power Grid, Geographically-Correlated Fail-
ures, Cascading Failures, Resilience, Survivability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent colossal failures of the power grid (such as the
Aug. 2003 blackout in the Northeastern United States and
Canada [2], [37]) demonstrated that large-scale and/or long-
term failures will have devastating effects on almost every as-
pect in modern life, as well as on interdependent systems (e.g.,
telecommunications, gas and water supply, and transportation).
Therefore, there is a need the study the vulnerability of the
existing power transmission system and to identify ways to
mitigate large-scale blackouts.
The power grid is vulnerable to natural disasters, such as
earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and solar flares [38] as well as
Fig. 1. The graph that represents part of the Western Interconnect and
sections of the Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas’ grids.
Green dots are demands (loads), red dots are supplies (generators), and neutral
nodes are not shown. This graph was used to derive numerical results.
to physical attacks, such as an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
attack [17], [18], [38]. Thus, we focus the vulnerability of the
power grid to an outage of several lines in the same geograph-
ical area (i.e., to geographically-correlated failures). Recent
works focused on identifying a few vulnerable lines throughout
the entire network [7], [8], [32], on designing line or node
interdiction strategies [9], [34], and on characterizing the
network graph and studying probabilistic failure propagation
models [12], [16], [23], [25], [39], [41]. However, our objec-
tive is to identify the most vulnerable areas in the power grid,
and examine appropriate real-time control countermeasures to
minimize the impact of an event of this type. Detection of the
most vulnerable areas has various practical applications, since
the system in these areas can be either shielded (e.g., against
EMP attacks or solar flares), strengthened (e.g., by increasing
the capacities of some relevant lines), or monitored (e.g., as
part of smart grid upgrade projects). Real-time control will
likely still be needed, in case the pre-strengthening of the grid
has overlooked a particular “attack” pattern.
Unlike graph-theoretical network flows, the flow in the
power grid is governed by the laws of physics and there are
no strict capacity bounds on the lines [6], [16], [27]. On
the other hand, there is a rating threshold associated with
each line, such that when the flow through a line exceeds
the threshold, the line heats up and eventually faults. Such
an outage, in turn, causes another change in the power grid,
that can eventually lead to a cascading failure. We describe
the linearized (i.e., DC) power flow model and the cascading
failure model (originated from [13] and extended in [7], [8])
that allow us to obtain analytic and numerical results despite
the problem’s complexity. We note that severe cascading
failures are hard to control in real time [4], [7], [8], [16],
[31], since the power grid optimization and control problems
are of enormous size. Thus, in our numerical experiments, we
apply basic control mechanisms that shed demands at the end
of each round.
We initially use the linearized power flow model to study
some simple motivating examples and to derive analytical
results regarding the cascade propagation in simple ring-based
topologies. We note that several previous works (e.g., [12],
[25], [30], [35], [41] and references therein) assumed that a
line or node failure leads with some probability to a failure
of nearby nodes or lines. Such epidemic-based modeling
allows using percolation-based tools to analyze the effects of
a cascade. However, we show that using the more realistic
power flow model leads to failure propagation characteristics
that are significantly different. Specifically, we show that
a failure of a line can lead to a failure of a line M hops
away (with M arbitrarily large). This result is of particular
importance, since it has been observed in real cascades (as the
recent one in the San Diego area, discussed in Section VIII).
Moreover, we prove that cascading failures can last arbitrarily
long time and that a network whose topology is a subgraph
of another topology can be more resilient to failures.
In this paper, we focus on contingency events in a grid
that are initiated by geographically correlated failures. We
represent the area affected by a contingency by a disk. Since
such a disk can theoretically be placed in an infinite number
of locations, we briefly discuss an efficient computational
geometric method (which builds on results from [1]) that
allows identifying a finite set of locations that includes all
possible failure events.
In our numerical experiments, we use the WECC (Western-
Interconnect) real power grid data taken from the Platts Ge-
ographic Information System (GIS) [33] (the resulting graph
appears in Figure 1). We present extensive numerical results
obtained by simulating the cascading failures for each of
the possible disk centers (the results have been obtained
by repeatedly and efficiently solving very large systems of
equations). When only few lines initially fault, cascading
failures usually start slowly and intensify over time [7], [8].
However, when the failures are geographically correlated, we
notice that in many cases this slow start phenomenon does
not exist. We illustrate the effects of the most (and the least)
devastating failures and show the yield (the overall reduction
in power generation) for all different failure locations in the
Western US. Moreover, we identify various relations between
parameters and performance metrics (such as yield, number of
components into which the network partitions, and number of
faulted lines which corresponds to the length of the repair
process). We also study the sensitivity of the results to
different failure models (stochastic vs. deterministic model),
to the value of the Factor of Safety (the ratio between line
capacity and normal flow on the line), and to whether or not
the line capacities are derived based on N − 1 contingency
plan.
While large scale cascades are quite rare [13], during our
work on this report, a cascade took place in the San Diego
area (on Sept. 8, 2011). The causes of this cascade are
still under investigation. Yet, we have been able to use some
preliminary information [11] to assess the accuracy of our
method and parameters. We conclude by discussing some of
the numerical results that we obtained for a similar scenario
and demonstrating that our methods have the potential to
identify vulnerable parts of the network.
Finally, we consider optimal control actions to be taken
in the event of such a failure. We show, experimentally,
that appropriate action taken at the appropriate time (and not
necessarily at the start of the cascade) can rapidly stop the
process, while losing a minimum quantity of demand.
Below are the main contributions of this paper. First, we
obtain analytical results regarding network vulnerability and
resilience under the power flow model which is significantly
different from the classical network flow models. These results
provide insights that significantly differ from insights obtained
from epidemic/percolation-based models. Second, we combine
techniques from optimization, computational geometry, and
communications network vulnerability analysis to develop
a method that allows obtaining extensive numerical results
regarding the effects of geographically correlated failures on a
real grid. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt
to obtain such results using real geographical data. Third,
we briefly illustrate that control actions have the potential to
mitigate the effects of even the worst case failure. The results
obtained in this paper will provide insight into the design of
control algorithms and network architectures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we present the related work and in Section III we describe the
power flow and cascade models. Section IV provides analyt-
ical results regarding simple network topologies. Section V
presents the method used to set some of the parameters and
the algorithm used to identify the most vulnerable locations
within the grid. Section VI describes the power grid data
used in this paper . In Section VII we present our numerical
findings regarding large scale failure and in Section VIII we
discuss the recent cascade in the San Diego area. Section
IX describes optimal control methods and their impact in the
particular case of one of the simulated worst-case events that
we compute. Section X provides concluding remarks and
directions for future work.
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II. RELATED WORK
The power grid and its robustness have drawn a lot of
attention recently, as efforts are being made to create a smarter,
more efficient, and more sustainable power grid (see, e.g., [2],
[19]). The power grid is traditionally modeled as a complex
system, made up of many components, whose interactions
(e.g., power flows and control mechanisms) are not effectively
computable (e.g., [3], [6] and references therein).
When investigating the robustness of the power grid, cas-
cading failures are a major concern [2], [13], [16], [22]. This
phenomenon, along with other vulnerabilities of the power
grid, was studied from a few different viewpoints. First, sev-
eral papers studied common topological properties of power
grid networks and probabilistic failure propagation models,
so that one can evaluate the behavior of a generic grid as a
self-organized critical system using, for example, percolation
theory (see [5], [12], [23], [25], [26], [30], [35], [39], [41] and
references therein). These works are closely related to a long
line of research in the power community which uses monte
carlo techniques to analyze system reliability (e.g., [10])
Another major line of research focused on specific (mi-
croscopic) power flow models and used them to identify a
few vulnerable lines throughout the entire network [7], [8],
[32]. In particular, [9], [34] focus on designing line or node
interdiction strategies that will lead to an effective attack on the
grid. Since the problem is computationally intractable, most
of these papers use a linearized direct-current (DC) model,
which is a tractable relaxation of the exact alternating-current
(AC) power flow model. In addition, the initial failure events
(causing eventually the cascading failures) are assumed to
be sporadic link outages (and in most cases, a single link
outage), with no correlation between them. On the contrary,
we focus on events that cause a large number of failures in a
specific geographical region (e.g., [18], [38]). To the best of
our knowledge, geographically-correlated failures in the power
grid have not been considered before and have been studied
only recently in the context of communication networks [1],
[14], [21], [29], [36].
Moreover, since cascading failures are highly dependent
on the network topology, we use the real topology of the
western U.S. power grid. While building on the linearized
model, we manage to obtain numerical results for a very
large scale real network (results for large networks have been
derived in the past using mostly probabilistic models [12],
[23], [30]). Perhaps, closest to us in its approach is [31]
that analyzes the effects of single line failures on the Polish
power grid. Yet, while [31] considers a real topology, it
does not take into account geographical effects. Moreover,
it applies control mechanisms that are more sophisticated
than the ones considered here. Control mechanisms are also
introduced in [4] that develops a method to trade off load
shedding and cascade propagation risk. Recently, [27], [28]
proposed efficient optimization algorithms for solving the
classical power flow problems. These algorithms use efficient
mathematical programming methods and can support offline
control decisions. However, they are not applicable when rapid
online control of the grid is required.
III. BASIC MODELS
We adopt the linearized (or DC) power flow model, which
is widely used as an approximation for more realistic non-
linear AC power model (see [6] for a survey on the power
flow models). In particular, we follow [7], [8] and represent
the power grid by a directed graph G, whose set of nodes
is N . Each of these nodes is classified either as a supply
node (“generator”), a demand node (“load”), or a neutral node.
Let D ⊆ N be the set of the demand nodes, and for each
node i ∈ D, let Di be its demand. Also, C ⊆ N denotes
the set of the supply nodes and for each node i ∈ C, Pi is
the active power generated at i. The edges of the graph G
represent the transmission lines. The orientation of the lines
is arbitrarily and is simply used for notational convenience.
We also assume pure reactive lines, implying that each line
(i, j) is characterized by its reactance xij .
Given supply and demand vectors (P,D), a power flow is
a solution (f, θ) of the following system of equations:
∑
(i,j)∈δ+(i)
fij −
∑
(j,i)∈δ−(i)
fji =


Pi, i ∈ C
−Di, i ∈ D
0, otherwise
(1)
θi − θj − xijfij = 0, ∀(i, j) (2)
where δ+(i) (δ−(i)) is the set of lines oriented out of (into)
node i, fij is the (real) power flow along line (i, j), and θi is
the phase angle of node i. These equations guarantee power
flow conservation in each neutral node, and take into account
the reactance of each line. In addition, since the orientation of
lines is arbitrary, a negative flow value simply means a flow
in the opposite direction.
When G is fully connected and
∑
i∈C Pi =
∑
i∈DDi, (1)–
(2) has a unique solution [8, Lemma 1.1]. This holds even
when G is not connected but the total supply and demand
within each of the connected components are equal.
We note that the DC power flow model resembles an
electrical circuit model, where phase angles are analogous to
voltages, reactance is analogous to resistance, and the power
flow is analogous to the current. The following observation,
which is analogous to Kirchoff’s law, captures the essence
of the model and provides easier way to look at (1)–(2)
analytically. It uses the notion of a path between nodes, which
is an alternating sequence of lines and adjacents nodes. (Proof
is in the appendix).
Observation 3.1: Consider two nodes a and b and two
paths π1 = (a, e0, v0, e1, v1, . . . , b) and π2 = (a, e′0, v′0, e′1, v′1,
. . . , b). The sum of the flow-reactance product feixei along
the lines of path π1 is equal to the sum of the flow-reactance
product along the lines of path π2. Specifically, the flows
along parallel lines with the same reactance is the same.
Next we describe the Cascading Failure Model. We assume
that each line (i, j) has a predetermined power capacity uij ,
which bounds its power flow in a normal operation of the
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Cascading Failure Model (Deterministic Case)
Input: Connected network graph G.
Initialization: Before time step t = 0, we have that
∑
i∈C
Pi =∑
i∈D
Di (i.e., the power is balanced), (1)–(2) are satisfied for G, and
all flows along all lines are within the corresponding power capacity.
Failure event: At time step t = 0, a failure of some subset of links
of G occurs. Let G.changed = true.
While G.changed is true do:
1) Adjust the total demand to the total supply within each
component of G.
2) Use the system (1)–(2) to recalculate the power flow in G.
3) For all lines compute a moving average
f˜
t
ij = α|fij |+ (1− α)f˜
t−1
ij
4) Remove from G all lines with flow moving average above
power capacity (f˜ tij > uij ). If at least one line was removed
at this step, let G.changed = true; otherwise, let G.changed =
false.
system (that is, |fij | ≤ uij). We assume that before a failure
event, G is fully connected, the total supply and demand are
equal, the power flows satisfy (1)–(2), and the power flow
of each line is at most its power capacity. Upon a failure,
some lines are removed from the graph, implying that it
may become disconnected. Thus, within each component,
we adjust the total demand to equal the total supply, by
decreasing the demand (supply) by the same factor at all
loads (generators). This process is sometimes called demand
shedding and naturally it causes a decrease in demand/supply.
Then, we use (1)–(2) to recalculate the power flows in the new
graph. The new flows may exceed the capacity and as a result,
the corresponding lines will become overheated. Thermal
effects cause overloaded lines to become more sensitive to
a large number of effects each of which could cause failure.
We model outages using a moving average of the power flow,
using a value f˜ tij = α|fij | + (1 − α)f˜
t−1
ij (in this paper, we
mostly use either α = 0.5 or α = 1). To first order, this
approximates thermal effects, including heating and cooling
from prior states. A similar moving average model was
considered in [4], [8]. A general outage rule gives the fault
probability of line (i, j), given its moving average f˜ tij . In this
paper, we consider the following rule:
P {Line (i, j) faults at round t} =


1, f˜ tij > (1 + ε)uij
0, f˜ tij ≤ (1− ε)uij
p, otherwise.
(3)
where 0 ≤ ε < 1 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 are parameters. When
ε = 0, we obtain a deterministic version of this rule. In this
case, lines (i, j) whose f˜ tij is above the power capacity uij
are removed from the graph.
The process is repeated in rounds until the system reaches
stability, namely until there is an iteration in which no lines
are removed. We note that our model does not have a notion
of exact time, however the relation between the elapsed time
and the corresponding time can be adjusted by using different
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Fig. 2. The M -ring RM . Each generation node and its two adjacent demand
node are a self-sustained area. No power flow is transmitted between these
areas (that is, along the tie lines).
values of α; in a sense, up to a certain degree, smaller value of
α implies that we take a more microscopic look at the cascade.
Our major metric to assess the severity of a cascading failure
is the system post-failure yield which is defined as follows:
Y ,
The actual demand at the stability
The original demand . (4)
In addition to the yield, other performance metrics will be
considered, such as the number of faulted lines, the number
of connected components, and the maximum line overload.
While the yield naturally gives an assessment of the severity
of the cascade after the process has already finished, the other
metrics may also shed light on the cascade properties after a
fixed (given) number of rounds.
Note that our model contains a very simple control mech-
anism, namely, round-by-round demand shedding. In Sec-
tion IX, we consider more elaborated control mechanisms and
compare the results.
IV. CASCADING FAILURES PROPERTIES IN SIMPLE
GRAPHS
In this section we describe important properties of the
power flow and cascading failure models in a simple graph.
Specifically, we show that unlike other flow models, cascading
failures in a power flow network are harder to predict and are
different from epidemic-like failure models, from the following
four reasons:
1) Consecutive failures in a cascade may happen within an
arbitrarily long distance of each other.
2) Cascading failures can last arbitrarily long time.
3) A network G1 whose topology is a subgraph of another
network G2 can be more resilient to failures than G2.
4) A failure event which results in initial failure of some
set of lines A can cause more damage than a failure
event, whose initial set of faulted lines is a superset of
A.
In order to prove the results, we use the following simple
power flow topology, which is depicted in Figure 2
Definition 1: An M -ring RM = 〈C ∪ D, E〉 is a directed
graph with M supply nodes C = {0, . . . ,M−1}, 2M demand
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nodes D = {M, . . . , 3M − 1}, two parallel transmission lines
connecting each generator i ∈ C to demand node M + 2i,
two parallel transmission lines connecting generator i ∈ C
to demand node M + 2i + 1, and a single transmission line
connecting demand node M +2i+1 (i ∈ C) to demand node
M+(2i+2 mod 2M)1. For each i ∈ C, the generation value
is Pi = 2, and the demand values are D2i = D2i+1 = 1. The
reactance value xij of all transmission lines is 1.
Clearly, one can view the M -ring as a collection of M
self sustained areas: each generator i supplies the demands
of M + 2i and M + 2i + 1. For brevity, we call the lines
connecting i and M+2i even lines, the lines connecting M +
2i+ 1 odd lines, and the lines connecting two demands (that
is, connecting two self-sustained areas) tie lines. Moreover,
we refer to odd and even lines collectively as internal lines.
By symmetry, we have the same power flow on all even
lines and odd lines. The solution of (1)–(2) verifies that this
is indeed the case: a power flow of 0.5 is transmitted from
each generator along its 4 adjacent internal lines, as shown in
Figure 2, the phase angle of all generators is the same, and
the phase angle of all demand nodes is the same. This also
implies that there is no flow on the tie lines. Notice that if
all lines has a power capacity of 0.5, it suffices to sustain that
power flow.
In the rest of the section, we will consider the following
types of failure events:
• Area failure: The four internal lines within Area i,
as well as the two lines connecting Area i to the ad-
jacent areas, fault. Namely, lines (i,M + 2i), (i,M +
2i)′, (i,M + 2i + 1), (i,M + 2i + 1)′, (M + (2i − 1
mod 2M),M+2i), (M+2i+1,M+(2i+2 mod 2M))
fault.
• Parallel lines failure: Two parallel internal lines within
Area i fault. Without loss of generality, we consider only
even parallel lines, that is, (i,M + 2i) and (i,M + 2i)′
fault.
• Odd line and even line failure: One odd line and one
even line within Area i fault. Namely, lines (i,M + 2i)
and (i,M + 2i+ 1) fault.
• Single internal line failure: Single internal line in Area i
faults. Without loss of generality, we consider only even
line, that is, line (i,M + 2i) faults.
• Tie line and internal line failure: Internal line in Area i,
as well as the tie line connected to the corresponding
demand, fault. Without loss of generality, we consider
only an even line and its corresponding tie line, that is,
(i,M +2i) and (M +(2i− 1 mod 2M),M +2i) fault.
It is important to notice that these failures cover the possible
types of geographical failures over the ring (some combina-
tions of these failures can also occur if the failure radius is
large enough). In this section, we will not consider sporadic
failure events (that is, in which the outaged lines are not
geographically-correlated), or initial events that partition the
1Parallel transmission lines are denoted (i, j) and (i, j)′. The orientation
of the lines is only for notational convenience.
graph such that there is a component whose total demand is
not equal to its total generation.
We next compare between an area failure and parallel lines
failure. As for area failure, it is easy to see that the same
power flow solution still holds, and therefore, the power flow
along all operating lines does not change. The loss of demand
is only 2 units and the resulting yield is M−1M . On the other
hand, upon parallel lines failure, the entire generation of node
i must be transmitted on the only operating lines connected to
node i: (i,M+2i+1) and (i,M+2i+1)′. Since the lines are
parallel, by symmetry, each of these lines transmits a power
of 1 unit (cf. Observation 3.1). In addition, by (1), the tie line
connecting area i to area i + 1 carries power of 1 unit since
node 2i+1’s demand is only 1. Now focus on Area i+1. The
total amount of incoming generation to this area is 3 units (2
units generated in node i+1 and one along the tie line in Area
i), while the total demand is 2 units. This immediately implies
that the tie line to Area i+2 carries one unit of power. As for
the flows on the lines within that area, one can verify that a
valid (and therefore the only) solution of (1)–(2) has no power
flow on lines (i + 1,M + 2i + 2) and (i + 1,M + 2i + 2)′
and one unit of power flow along (i + 1,M + 2i + 3) and
(i+ 1,M + 2i+ 3)′. This flow assignment is identical to the
assignment of Area i, and therefore, by inductive arguments, it
is valid for all the areas in the ring. Moreover, there are three
phase values in the solution: one for all generation nodes, one
for all even demand nodes, and one for all odd demand nodes.
Based on the power capacity of the lines uij , the moving
average parameter α of the cascading failure model, and the
FoS of the entire system, we can derive the following results
(all proofs are in the appendix):
Lemma 4.1: Consecutive failures in a cascade may happen
within an arbitrarily long distance of each other.
We note that Lemma 4.1 captures an important difference
between our model and previously-suggested models, that
assume that power grid failures propagate in an epidemic-
like manner. While, under these models, a line failure causes
only adjacent node/line (or a line with small distance) to fault,
our model captures situations in which the cascade “skips”’
large distances within a single iteration. As we will discuss
in Section VIII, this was indeed the case in a recent real-life
cascade causing a major blackout in California.
Lemma 4.2: A failure of o(1) of the lines may cause an
outage of a constant fraction of the lines, within one iteration.
The following two lemmas show that the failures do not
always behave monotonically:
Lemma 4.3: An initial failure event of some set of lines A
may result in a lower yield than a failure event, whose initial
set of faulted lines is a superset of A.
Lemma 4.4: A network G1, whose topology is a subgraph
of the topology of another network G2, may obtain higher
yield.
We note that in practice, if the failures are geographically
correlated, non-monotone situations, as described in Lem-
mas 4.3 and 4.4, rarely happen. Thus, in the rest of the paper
(and specifically, in the algorithm described in Section V-B),
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we assume only a monotone behavior of the failures.
Up until now, we dealt with very specific type of failures,
which intuitively breaks the ring into a chain. In general, such
failures are easier to analyze since (2) does not form contraints
in a cyclic manner (that is, one can assign the phase value of
the nodes based only on the flows and the phase value of the
nodes that precedes it). More formally, this extra difficulty
is captured by Observation 3.1, and looking at the different
paths between each pair of nodes. When the ring breaks into
a chain, all these paths follow one “direction”. On the other
hand, when the ring does not break, there are both clockwise
and counter-clockwise paths that need to be considered. We
demonstrate this difference by comparing a single internal line
failure of line (0,M) (that does not break the ring into chain)
with a tie line and internal line failure of lines (0,M) and
(3M − 1,M) (which breaks the ring into chain).
In the tie line and internal line failure, one can simply assign
a power flow of 1 unit along the parallel line (0,M)′, where
the phase difference between node 0 and M is 1 (to meet
the constraint of (2)); the rest of the flows and phases remain
unchanged. However, this solution is not valid in case of a
single internal line failure, since there is a phase difference
between node M and 3M − 1, and therefore, it is impossible
that no flow traverses the operating line between them. We
note also that in the odd and even lines failure (which does
not break the chain either), the flows on the lines parallel to the
failures increase to 1 by changing solely the generator phase.
Since the demand nodes’ phases do not change, this failure is
localized within that single area.
We next show that the power flow values induced by the
single line failure change across the entire graph and depends
on the value of M :
Lemma 4.5: Consider an M -ring, in which line (0,M)
failed. Then, after the first iteration:
(i) The flow along line (0,M)′ is 2M/(2M + 0.5).
(ii) The flow along all other even lines is M/(2M + 0.5).
(iii) The flow along all odd lines is 1−M/(2M + 0.5).
(iv) The flow along all tie lines is 1− 2M/(2M + 0.5).
Corollary 4.6: An M -ring requires power capacity of 1/9
on its tie lines and a power capacity of 1 on its internal lines
to withstand any failure of one line.
Interestingly, one can see that as M gets larger, a single
internal line failure has the same effect as the corresponding
tie line and internal line failure. This stems from the fact
that the closed-loop effects, initially distinguishing between
the failures, are fading away as the ring gets larger.
Finally, the next lemma shows that, unlike the examples we
presented on the ring, cascades can be made arbitrarily long
(in time). The lemma uses another topology which is depicted
in Figure 15.
Lemma 4.7: The length of the cascade (the number of
iterations until the system stabilizes) can be arbitrarily large.
To conclude, using simple examples we highlight the diffi-
culties and differences between prior models used to analyze
the power grid and the models we use. In the rest of the paper,
we will investigate how these models behave in real-life power
grid and geographically-correlated failures.
V. POWER GRID RESILIENCE
A. Parameters Set-up
We note that in the cascading failure model, the power
capacities uij of the lines are given a-priori. In practice,
however, these capacities are hard to obtain and are usually
estimated based on the actual operation of the power grid. In
this paper, we take the N−k contingency analysis approach [8]
in order to estimate the power capacities. Namely, we set
the capacities so that the network is resilient to failure of
any set of k out of the N lines. In addition, we consider
over-provisioning of lines capacity by a constant fraction of
the required capacity of each line. This over-provisioning
parameter, denoted by K , is often referred to as the Factor of
Safety (FoS) of the grid.
Specifically, we focus on the following two cases.
• N -resilient grids (that is, k = 0). In this case, we solve
(1)–(2) for the original grid graph (without failures) and
set the power capacity to uij = K · fij , where K ≥ 1.
• (N − 1)-resilient grids (that is, k = 1). In this case,
we solve (1)– (2) for N graphs, each resulting from a
single line failure event. The power capacity is set to
uij = K · maxr f rij , where f rij is the flow assigned to
line (i, j) when considering the rth failure event.
It is worth mentioning that the real power grid is usually
assumed to be at least N -resilient with K ≈ 1.2 [15]. On
the other hand, some data show that certain lines (or, more
generally, paths) are more resilient than others. For example,
a historical transmission paths data found in [40] shows that
some transmission paths have power capacities which are 1.1
times their normal flow, while others have an FoS larger than
2. Nevertheless, the average FoS is indeed around 1.2. In
addition, utility companies usually guarantee that their grid is
at least (N−1)-resilient [8]2. Therefore, by setting the power
capacities parameters, we examine in this paper both N - and
(N−1)-resilient grids with different FoS values K . Most of
our numerical results are presented for a grid with FoS K =
1.2.
B. Identification of Vulnerable Locations
We consider a circular and deterministic failure model,
where all lines and nodes within a radius r of the failure’s
epicenter are removed from the graph (this includes lines
that pass through the affected area). In addition, we assume
monotonicity of failures: if the initial set of faulted lines due
to event A is a subset of the faulted lines due to event B,
then the yield of A is at least that of B. We note that in the
general case, this property does not hold (see Lemma 4.3).
However, we observed that such events rarely happen in real
power grid systems, and when they do, it is only when both
events have a marginal effect. Since our goal is to identify the
2We note that early reports on the recent San Diego blackout indicate that
this was not the case.
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most vulnerable locations in a real power grid, this is a valid
assumption for practical purposes.
To identify the candidates for the most vulnerable locations,
we use computational geometric methods developed in [1] for
identifying the vulnerable locations in fiber-optic networks.
For each line, we define an r-hippodrome, which captures
all points in the plane R2 whose distance from the line is at
most the failure radius r. We focus on the arrangement of
hippodromes, which is the subdivision of the plane into ver-
tices, arcs, and faces. The vertices are the intersection points
of the hippodromes, the arcs are either maximally connected
circular arcs or straight line segments of the boundaries of
hippodromes that occur between the vertices, and faces are
maximally connected regions bounded by arcs.
Once the vertices of the arrangements are identified, we treat
each vertex v as a candidate for a failure epicenter and denote
by L(v) the set of lines within radius r of v (L(v) can be easily
found). We then use the Cascading Failure Model, described
in Section III, with L(v) as the set of lines that initially fault.
Naturally, the process of checking all candidates (each with a
different initial failure event) can be easily parallelized.
Arrangements are well-established concept in computational
geometry, and it can be easily shown that in order to find
the vulnerable locations, it is sufficient to consider only the
vertices of the arrangements. In particular, for any point p ∈
R
2
, there is a vertex v such that L(p) ⊆ L(v). Notice that
computing arrangements is quadratic in the number of lines.
Thus, we parallelized this computation as well by partitioning
the graph into several sections (with small number of lines)
and finding vertices of the arrangements in each section. To
ensure that no vertices are lost in the border between two
sections, the sections have a 2r overlap.
VI. POWER GRID DATA
We use real power grid data of the western US taken
from the Platts Geographic Information System (GIS) [33].
This includes the information about the transmission lines,
power substations, power plants, and the population at each
geographic location. Since, in GIS each transmission line is
defined as a link between two power substation, substations
are used as nodes in our graph. In order not to expose the
vulnerability of the real grid, we used a part of the Western
Interconnect system which does not include the Canada and
Mexico sections. On the other hand, we attached to the grid
the Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas’
grids, which are not part of the Western Interconnect. The
resulting graph (see Figure 1) has 14,968 nodes (substations)
and 19,513 lines. Moreover, it has 1,920 power stations which
were merged with the substations as described below. We note
that there is a small number of very dense areas (e.g., the Los
Angeles area), while the rest of the grid is very sparse. This
structure can be seen in many other typical power grids, such
as the US Eastern Interconnect as well as European systems.
Furthermore, recent research on topological models for power
grid systems show similar results [23]. Thus, our results will
probably carry over to other grids.
We performed the following processing steps for this graph.
Coordinate transformation: The coordinates of the substa-
tions in the GIS system are given by their longitude and
latitude. We transformed these to planar (x, y) coordinates,
using the great-circle distance method.
Connectivity check: We identified the connected components
of the raw GIS graph, which consists of one large connected
component and few small ones. Moreover, we identified some
substations that appear in the transmission lines data but are
absent in the substations data. The number of these substations
is small, and therefore, after manual inspection, they were
either eliminated or merged with other nearby substations (see
also the next step).
Nodes merging and lines elimination: For each node outside
the large component, we found the closest node within the
large component. If the distance between them was below a
given threshold (10 Km), we merged the two nodes. Then,
the remaining disconnected nodes were inspected manually
and were either eliminated or merged. At the end of this
process, we obtained a fully-connected graph (that is, a single
connected component) with 13,992 nodes and 18,681 lines.
Identifying demands and supplies: Demands were asso-
ciated with the closest node to each populated area (i.e.,
zip-code) and were set to be proportional to the population
size (the normalization factor is computed by comparing the
total population and total generation output of the entire
grid). Supplies were associated with closest node to each
power plant (the generation capacity of the power plants is
taken from the GIS). Then, for each node, we computed the
difference between its total corresponding supplies and total
corresponding demands. Thus, all nodes were characterized
by a real number: positive for a supply node, negative for
a demand node, and zero for a neutral node. The resulting
categorization appears in Figure 1. Overall, 1,117 nodes were
classified as generators (supplies), 5,591 as loads (demands),
and 7,284 as neutral. Most of the neutral nodes are closely
connected to each other and to one of the non-neutral nodes,
thus drawing the power/demand from them.
Determining the system parameters: The GIS does not
provide the power capacities of the transmission lines, nor their
reactance. However, these parameters are needed for the power
flow and cascading failure models. The reactance of a line
depends on its physical properties (such as its material) and
there is a linear relation between its length and reactance: the
longer the line is, the larger its reactance. Thus, we assumed
that all lines have the same physical properties (other than
length) and used the length to determine the reactance. It is
important to notice that the flow part of the solution of (1)–
(2) is scale invariant to the reactance (that is, multiplying the
reactance of all lines by the same factor does not change the
values of the flows). Thus, we simply use the length of the
line as its reactance. Regarding the power capacities, we take
the approach described in Section V-A. In particular, we use
N−k contingency analysis, with k ∈ {0, 1} and different FoS
values K .
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VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We identified the potential failure locations using the algo-
rithm described in Section V-B implemented in MATLAB. We
present results for r = 50 kilometers, which is small enough to
capture realistic scenarios [18], [38], while it is large enough to
generate a cascading failure in most cases (the results for other
values of r are omitted, due to space constraints). For r = 50,
the algorithm identified 61,327 potential failure locations. The
identification of these locations was done on an eight-core
server in less than 24 hours.
For each failure location v, we performed the simulation
of the Cascading Failure Model, presented in Section III,
assuming that all lines in L(v) fail. The simulation was
performed using a program that efficiently solves very large
systems of linear equations, using CPLEX [24] and Gurobi
[20] optimization tools.
To assess the severity of a cascading failure, we use the
following four metrics, which are measured in the end of the
cascade: The yield, as defined in (4); the total number of
outaged lines, which indicates the time it takes to recover the
grid after the cascade: the larger the number of outaged lines,
the longer is the actual time of the corresponding blackout;
the number of connected components; and the number of
rounds until stability.
A. N-Resilience Experiments
The first set of experiments was performed after using the
N contingency analysis to set the capacities of the network,
with FoS K = 1.2 and K = 2.
First, we plot specific failures to show how they evolved
during the first five rounds of the cascade. Figure 3 shows
three failure events for FoS K = 1.2: Two in California, both
leading to severe blackouts, and another one around the Idaho-
Montana-Wyoming border, which had a less severe effect. The
round-by-round maximum overload (that is, maxij fij/uij)
for these failures and K = 1.2 is shown in Table I. The
same failures for K = 2 are shown in Figure 17 in the
appendix. As expected, higher FoS usually leads to less severe
blackout effect. Interestingly, the Idaho-Montana-Wyoming
border failure with FoS K = 1.2 leads to low yield (0.39),
although the development of the failure is very slow—after
5 rounds only few lines were faulted. However, the same
event with K = 2 leads to near-unity yield. We note that
this suggests that the assumption that K = 1.2 for all lines
is quite pessimistic, as also can be seen from the actual data
(see Section V-A for more details).
Scatter graphs for different metrics after 5 rounds and with
FoS K = 1.2 are shown in Figure 4. It can be seen an increase
in the initial number of faulted lines leads to an increase in
the total number of faulted lines at the end of the fifth round:
if 400, 800, 1,200 lines initially faulted, at least 2,847, 3,600,
4, 669 are faulted at the end, respectively. Furthermore, an
increase in the initial number of faulted lines leads also to
an increase in the number of connected components: if 400,
800, 1,200 lines initially faulted, the number of components
is at least 696, 1,382, 1,973, respectively. Similar results for
0.326
(a) San Diego area failure event.
0.296
(b) San Francisco area failure event.
0.39
(c) Idaho-Montana-Wyoming border failure event.
Fig. 3. Illustration of cascading failures over 5 rounds for N -resilient
grid with FoS K = 1.2, where the initial failure locations are in the (a)
Los Angeles area, (b) San Francisco area, and (c) Idaho-Montana-Wyoming
border. The final yields are 0.326, 0.296, and 0.39, respectively. The colors
represent the rounds in which the lines faulted.
K = 2 are shown in Figures 17 and 16 in the appendix. These
results clearly show that in this case the grid is much more
resilient to cascading failure.
Next, we analyze the severity of cascading failures once
stability is reached. Namely, when no more line failures occur.
The results for FoS K = 1.2 are shown in Figure 5. In this
case, the vast majority of the failures resulted in yield in the
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TABLE I
ROUND-BY-ROUND MAXIMUM LINE OVERLOAD maxij fij/uij FOR THE
CASCADING FAILURES SHOWN IN FIGURE 3.
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Fig. 4. The effects of the number of initially faulted lines on the total
number of faulted lines (left) and the number of components (right), after 5
rounds of cascade (FoS K = 1.2).
range of 0.2–0.46.
Figure 5(a) focuses on points whose yield is in [0.2, 0.46].
The variance of the yield is larger when the initial number
of faulted lines is smaller. Moreover, as expected, there is
an inverse correlation between the yield and the total number
of faulted lines. Figure 5(b) shows the relation between the
number of initially faulted lines and the number of rounds
until stability, and in turn, the relation between the latter and
the yield. We can see a threshold effect in the yield: when
the number of rounds is small, the yield is around 1, while
when more than 10 rounds are required, the yield drops to
0.5 and below. The correlation between the number of rounds
and the number of initially faulted lines suggests (somewhat
surprisingly) that usually a smaller number of initially faulted
lines leads to a larger number of rounds until stability.
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the yield, the number of rounds
until stability, and the number of faulted lines at stability
(respectively) by failure location.
B. (N−1)-Resilience Experiments
The second set of experiments was performed after using
the N − 1 contingency analysis to set the capacities of the
network, with FoS K = 1.2. The results are presented in
Figures 7 and 8. Regarding the failure events indicated in
Figure 3, the corresponding yield values at stability in this
case are 0.352, 0.333 ,and 0.999, respectively. The comparison
between the results of N - and (N−1)-resilience with the same
FoS (K = 1.2) suggests, as expected, that (N−1)-resilience
helps when the initial event is not significant (such as the
Idaho-Montana-Wyoming border event). However, it makes
little difference when the initial event is significant (such as
San Diego or San Francisco events). In particular, note that
the failures in the artificially attached part of Texas do not lead
to cascades when the network is (N−1)-resilient. This is due
to the fact that this part is connected to the whole network
0 400 800 1200
# Initially Faulted Lines
The Yield0.5
0.35
0.2
0.5
0.35
0.2
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
# Faulted Lines
The Yield
(a) The yield as a function of the number of initially faulted lines (left) and
the yield as a function of total number of faulted lines (right) .
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(b) The number of rounds as a function of the number of initially faulted
lines (left) and the yield as a function of the number of rounds (right).
Fig. 5. Comparison between different performance metric at stability (FoS
K = 1.2).
using small number of lines (which carry no power in normal
operation in practice). However, when the network is only N
resilient, these failures do propagate to the whole network3.
C. Stochastic Outage Rule
The third set of experiments was performed using a stochas-
tic outage rule as defined in (3) with ε > 0 and p = 0.5.
In order to evaluate this outage rule, we performed two
types of experiments on an N -resilient grid with FoS K = 1.2.
First, for the same failure epicenter, we compared the yield of
different values of ε: Figure 9 shows the average yield and
its standard deviation for a representative failure epicenter (the
results are based on 100 independent runs for each value of ε).
Observe that ε ∈ (0, 0.15) leads to a bit higher average yield
than that of the deterministic rule. However, for ε ≥ 0.15,
the average yield obtained when using the stochastic rule is
significantly lower.
In the second type of experiments, we fixed ε = 0.04 and
compared the results of selected failure epicenters with the
results obtained for the deterministic outage rule. The failure
epicenters were chosen such that the yield using deterministic
rule grows approximately linearly with the failure index. The
results, depicted in Figure 10, show that there is a certain
yield range where the stochastic outage rule coincides with
the deterministic outage rule. However, outside this range, the
stochastic outage rule results in the yield values below 0.3,
which are smaller than the yield obtained by a deterministic
outage rule (even when this deterministic yield is almost 1).
VIII. SAN DIEGO BLACKOUT (SEPT. 2011)
A. Description of the Blackout
On Sept. 8th, 2011, over 2.7 million people in southwestern
United States experienced a massive power blackout. Al-
3This happens also even when the FoS is 2 (these results are not shown
due to space constraints).
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(a) The yield values at stability.
(b) The number of rounds until stability.
(c) The number of faulted lines at stability.
Fig. 6. Vulnerability analysis (at stability) of failure locations for N -resilient
grid with FoS K = 1.2. The color of each point (which is a vertex of the
arrangement) represents the value corresponding to a cascade whose epicenter
is at that point (points that do not appear on the map cause outages that are
a subset of the outages caused by a nearby vertex).
though the full details of this event are not known yet, several
publicly available sources, such as [11], make it possible
to reconstruct an approximate chain of events during this
blackout. As a case study, we compare the reported chain
of events to our simulation results. In particular, we use this
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# Initially Faulted Lines
The Yield1
0.6
0.2
7000
4500
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# Faulted Lines
4000
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1000
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# Connected Components
2000
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40
0 400 800 1200
20
# Initially Faulted Lines
# Rounds Until Stability
Fig. 7. Comparison between different performance metrics at
stability;(N−1)-resilient grid with FoS K = 1.2.
event in order to calibrate the various model parameters so
that the simulation results match as closely as possible that
cascade.
The blackout occurred around the San-Diego county area,
and involved six utility companies: San-Diego Gas and
Electric Co. (SDG&E), Southern California Edison (SCE),
Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE), Imperial Irrigation
District (IID), Arizona Public Service (APS), and Western
Area Power Association (WAPA). The power grid map of that
area (using our data) is shown in Figure 114. Specifically,
there are two import generation paths into this area:
1) SWPL, which is represented by the 500KV Hassayampa-
North Gila-Imperial Valley-Miguel transmission line.
This path transmits the power generated in Palo Verdi
Nuclear Generating Station in Arizona.
2) Path 44, which is represented by the three 500KV trans-
mission lines that connect SCE and SDG&E through the
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS).
In addition, there are several SDG&E local power plants, and
there is (relatively small) import of power from CFE.
Prior to the event, SWPL delivered 1370MW, Path 44 de-
livered 1287MW, and the local generation was 2229MW [11]
(this includes the generation of both SDG&E and CFE power
plants). The cascade started at 15:27:39, when the 500KV
Hassayampa-North Gila transmission line tripped at the North
Gila substation. Several sources indicate that this failure was
caused by maintenance works performed at this substation at
that time. Initial investigation suggested that this single line
failure caused the blackout5. The actual cascade development
is shown in Figure 11.
4In these experiments, the actual Western Interconnect map was used,
which includes the relevant parts of Northern Baja California in Mexico.
5Recently, some of the media publications mentioned the fact that this was
not the only fault in that area. However, since these facts are still under
investigation, we prefer to reconstruct the cascading failure according to the
chain of event described in [11].
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(a) The yield values at stability.
(b) The number of rounds until stability.
(c) The number of faulted lines at stability.
Fig. 8. Vulnerability analysis (at stability) of failure locations for an (N−1)-
resilient grid with FoS K = 1.2. The color of each point (which is a vertex
of the arrangement) represents the value corresponding to a cascade whose
epicenter is at that point.
B. Simulation Results
We performed two sets of experiments. In the first set,
instead of performing simulation on the entire Western Inter-
connect, we chose to use a part of the grid which includes only
the affected area. The initial conditions were set to match as
close as possible the actual conditions prior to the event. In
particular, we set the generation of the Palo Verde nuclear
plant (which is the main contributing import generation unit)
to 3,600 MW out of its nominal 4,300MW. This resulted
(a) (b)
0.04
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0.03
0.6
0.2
0.4
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.50 0
ǫ ǫ
Average Yield Yield Standard Deviation
Fig. 9. The results for a representative failure epicenter, using stochastic
outage rule, based on 100 independent runs. (a) presents the average yield,
while (b) presents its standard deviation.
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Fig. 10. A comparison of the deterministic and stochastic outage rules for
selected failure events.
Fig. 11. The development of the San Diego blackout according to [11].
in the following initial conditions of the import generation:
SWPL = 1,386MW, Path 44 = 1,284MW.
Moreover, since in the actual event there was no (N − 1)-
resilience with respect to the faulted North Gila–Hassyampa
line, we used an N -resilient grid with different values of
FoS K (recall Section V-A). In addition, by [11], the actual
capacity of Path 44 is almost 2.7 times the flow in normal
operation. This information also correlates with other sources
(e.g., [40]) which indicate that the power capacities are not
based on a uniform FoS parameter. Since Path 44 was a major
factor of the cascade development, as it carried most of the
lost SWPL power, we decided to adjust its FoS accordingly.
In particular, its FoS was set to 2.5. After experimenting with
the value of K for other lines, we found out that K = 1.5
leads to a behavior that most resembles that of the actual event
. The resulting cascade behavior is shown in Figure 12.
Table II presents a brief comparison of the simulation results
and the known details of the actual event. The description of
the actual event is presented exactly as in [11], without any
interpretation. It can be observed that although the simulated
cascade does not follow exactly the actual one, both of them
developed in a similar way. This suggests that our model and
data can be used to identify the vulnerable locations and design
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Fig. 12. The development of the San Diego blackout in the first eight rounds
using our simulation.
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Fig. 13. Maximum line overload for different values of α.
corresponding control mechanisms that will allow to stop the
cascades in the early stages.
The second set of experiments was performed on the whole
Western Interconnect, and the goal was to examine the effect
of the moving average parameter α on both the maximum
line overloads and the length of the cascade. The results (see
Figure 13) show that the larger α is, the higher is the maximum
load and the shorter is the cascade. Moreover, when α is
small (i.e., less than 0.5), there is a period of time when the
maximum overload is smaller than that at the initial round.
This suggests that a control mechanism that is applied at that
time will stop the cascade with relatively high yield in early
rounds.
IX. CONTROL
This section describes experiments with control algorithms
in the specific case of the San Diego event, illustrated in Figure
3(a). The general goal of such algorithms is to stop the cascade
(and, if possible, in a short time frame) without losing much
demand.
In particular, we consider an algorithm that will shed a
minimum amount of demand so as to yield a stable grid – the
cascade has been stopped. In this paper (for lack of space),
we focus on algorithms that will operate within a single round
of the cascade. The critical question is, then, at which round
control should be applied. Assuming that a given round t is
Actual Simulation
1 Path 44: 1415MW;
El Centro substation internal
line overload of 100MW.
15:27 Path 44: 2407MW; 2 Path 44: 1438MW;
Problems with Imperial El Centro internal line trip.
Valley-El Centro line
resulting in 100MW
swing.
15:32 Path 44: 2616MW; 3 Path 44: 1992MW;
Two lines trip at
Niland-WAPA and
Niland-Coachella Valley.
15:35 Path 44: 2959MW; 4 Path 44: 3043MW;
IID and WAPA are Niland-Coachella Valley
separated. line overload.
15:37 Path 44: 3006MW; 5 Path 44: 2991MW;
IID tie line to WAPA Niland-WAPA and Niland-
trips. Coachella Valley lines trip.
15:38 Path 44 trip; 6 Path 44 trip;
SONGS trips. 4 out of 7 lines from SONGS
to San Diego trip.
7 SONGS stabilizes with total
generation of 1350MW
out of 2253MW.
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF THE ACTUAL EVENT AND THE SIMULATION RESULTS.
under consideration, our control is constrained as follows:
(a) At each demand point i ∈ D, we reduce the demand by
a certain quantity, si.
(b) We adjust generator output, within each component
(a.k.a. island) so as to maintain overall balance.
(c) However, generators are furthermore constrained in that
the amount of change in a generator must be proportional
to its current output.
(d) After the demand shedding and generator adjustments,
the moving-average power flow, on each operating line
(i, j), cannot exceed its capacity uij .
Rule (c) approximates generator “ramp-up” and “ramp-down”
constraints (broadly speaking, generators cannot modify their
output arbitrarily fast). Rule (d) states that, according to our
thermal model, the cascade will stop. Rules (a)-(d) describe
our constraints; the goal is to pick the round t and the
quantities si so as to maximize the remaining demand.
Note that, at a given round t, this optimization problem
can be written as a linear program. Specifically, denote by
f˜ tij , D˜
t
i , P˜
t
i the value, just before round t, of the flow on line
(i, j), the demand at demand point i ∈ D, and the generation
at supply point i ∈ C, respectively. Furthermore, denote
by C1, . . . Cn the connected components in the power grid
graph before round t, and let comp(i) denote the connected
component that contain node i. The linear program is as
follow:
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Fig. 14. Illustration of cascading failures over 5 rounds using stochastic
outage rule with ε = 0.05, p = 0.5, and α = 0.1. The colors represent the
rounds in which the lines faulted.
minimize
∑
i∈D si subject to
0 ≤ si ≤ D˜
t
i ∀i ∈ D
α|fij | + (1− α)f˜
t
ij ≤ (1− ε)uij ∀ line (i, j)∑
(i,j)∈δ+(i) fij−
∑
(j,i)∈δ−(i) fji=Pi, ∀i ∈ C∑
(i,j)∈δ+(i) fij−
∑
(j,i)∈δ−(i) fji=−(D˜
t
i−si) ∀i ∈ D∑
(i,j)∈δ+(i) fij−
∑
(j,i)∈δ−(i) fji=0, ∀i ∈ N\(C∪D)
θi − θj − xijfij = 0 ∀ line (i, j)
0 ≤ λCm ≤ 1 ∀ component Cm
Pi = P˜
t
i (1− λ
comp(i)) ∀i ∈ C∑
i∈Cm∩C
Pi =
∑
i∈Cm∩D
Di ∀ component Cm
where, as in Section III, δ+(i) (δ−(i)) is the set of lines
oriented out of (into) node i. Notice that third-sixth equations
in the linear program above are identical to Equations (1)-(2)
in Section III.
As mentioned before, we demonstrate our control mecha-
nism by considering a failure event in San Diego area. Figure
14 presents the development of this event over the first five
rounds of a particular run obtained using the stochastic line
failure model with ε = 0.05, p = 0.5, and α = 0.1 (that is, a
simulation with small time increments).
Table III outlines the performance of the optimal control
mechanism, where “Round” refers to the round on which the
optimal control is applied, while “Yield” refers to the outcome.
We see from the table that applying control at the outset of the
cascade is not optimal (this is typical, in our experience). On
the other hand, waiting too long is not optimal either. Rather,
there is a critical frame of time where effective control is
possible; the precise time frame can be discovered by running
our simulation upon the failure event, and applying the control
only when we reach the round with optimal outcome. We also
note that without control, the cascade stops at round 74 with
the yield of 0.34. Currently, we are developing robust versions
of this algorithm with respect to errors in data, timing, and
delays in implementation.
TABLE III
OPTIMAL CONTROL OUTCOME.
Round 1 5 10 20 30 40 50 74
Yield 0.22 0.55 0.49 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.36 0.34
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered a DC power flow and an
accompanied cascading failure model. We showed analytically
that these models differ from previously-studied model based
on an epidemic-like failures (which are often analyzed using
percolation theory). Then, we used techniques from optimiza-
tion and computational geometry along with detailed GIS data
to develop a method for identifying the power grid locations
that are vulnerable to geographically correlated failures. We
performed extensive numerical experiments that show the
relations between the various parameters and performance
metrics. Specifically, we used a recent major blackout event in
San Diego area as a case study to calibrate different parameters
of the simulations. We also demonstrated that the use of
control at the right point in the cascade can mitigate the effects
of a large scale failure. While the presented results are for an
intentionally modified version of the US Western Interconnect,
they demonstrate the strength of our tools and provide insights
into the issues affecting the resilience of the grid. These results
can be used when designing new power grids, when making
decisions regarding shielding or strengthening existing grids,
and when determining the locations for deploying metering
equipment.
This is one of the first steps towards an understanding of
the grid resilience to large scale failures. Hence, there are
still many open problems. For example, we plan to study the
results’ sensitivity to the failure model (e.g., to consider a rule
under which the probability of a line failure is a function of
the overload). Moreover, we plan to study the effectiveness of
some of the current control algorithms and their capability to
cope with geographically correlated failures. Finally, we plan
to develop control algorithms that will mitigate the effects of
such failures and network design tools that would enable to
construct resilient grids.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Observation 3.1: Let fei be the flow along line
ei, let xei be its reactance and let θvi be the phase angle of
node vi. By summing over the equalities of (2) for the lines
of path p1 we get θa− θb =
∑
ei∈p1
feixei . Similarly, for p2,
θa − θb =
∑
e′
i
∈p2
fe′
i
xe′
i
, and the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Consider an M -ring, and suppose
that M is even (similar arguments can be used when M is
odd). Assume that the capacity of all lines is 1, except lines
(M/2,M + M/2 + 1) and (M/2,M + M/2 + 1)′ whose
capacity is 0.5. Assume also that α > 0. Initially, the ring
operates flawlessly, and all power flows are within the capacity
of the corresponding lines.
Suppose that an initial failure event occur in lines (0,M)
and (0,M)′ (that is, a parallel lines failure). As described
above, all lines will either carry flow of 0 or of 1, and therefore
all lines except (M/2,M+M/2+1) and (M/2,M+M/2+1)′
will continue operating normally.
As for lines (M/2,M+M/2+1) and (M/2,M+M/2+1)′,
their post-failure power flow is 1 while their pre-failure flow
is 0.5. Since for each α > 0, α · 1 + (1 − α) · 0.5 > 0.5 =
uM/2,M+M/2+1, these lines fault in the next round. Thus, the
distance between consecutive failures in this cascade is Θ(M).
As one can choose an arbitrarily large M -ring, the distance
between there two consecutive failures can be made arbitrarily
large and the claim follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.2: When the power capacity u of
each line is 0.5, the same failure described in the proof of
Lemma 4.1, which starts with 2 lines failure, causes an outage
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of 3/5 of the lines. Notice that in this case after the first
iteration there is a demand shedding of half the total demand.
Only odd lines still operate and each one of them carries a
power flow of 0.5 unit (which is below its power capacity).
Thus, this specific failure event stops after one iteration.
Proof of Lemma 4.3: Consider an M -ring and assume
that the capacity of all lines is 0.5, and, for ease of presen-
tation, that α = 1. Initially, the ring operates flawlessly, and
all power flows are within the capacity of the corresponding
lines.
Let A = {(0,M), (0,M)′} (parallel lines failure). As
described above, after a single iteration, all tie lines and odd
lines will carry power flow of 1 unit, exceeding their capacity
and therefore faulting. This will cause a demand shedding of
2 unit within Area 1 (no remaining active power lines); in the
rest of the areas there will be a demand shedding of 1 unit (odd
demand node will be disconnected), resulting in a total demand
shedding of M + 1, and a total yield of (M − 1)/2M < 0.5.
On the other hand, assume an area failure of Area 0. Clearly,
the area failure is a superset of A. However, the area failure
event causes only demand shedding of 2 and therefore a yield
of (M − 1)/M > 0.5 (for every M > 2). The reason is that
in that case the cascade does not propagate outside Area 0,
and all other power flows remain the same.
Proof of Lemma 4.4: Consider an M -ring and an M -
ring with no tie-lines (which is a subgraph of the M -ring).
Assume that the capacity of all lines is 0.5, and, for ease of
presentation, that α = 1.
As we have shown before that a failure in {(0,M), (0,M)′}
causes a yield less than 0.5 in the M -ring. On the other hand,
when there are no tie-line, this failure is contained within Area
1, resulting in a yield of at least (2M − 2)/2M > 0.5 (for
M > 2). The same localization property holds for all other
types of failures.
Proof of Lemma 4.5: Assume that the flow on line
(0,M)′ is y. Thus, (1) and Observation 3.1 imply that the
flow of each of the lines (0,M + 1) and (0,M + 1)′ is
1
2 (2 − y) = 1 −
y
2 . In addition, (1) implies that the flow
on the tie line connecting Area 0 and Area 1 is 1− y.
Focus on Area 1. Similar arguments yield that the flow on
(1,M+2) and (1,M+2)′ is y/2, the flow on (1,M +2) and
(1,M+2)′ is 1−y/2 and the flow on the tie line is 1−y. By
symmetry, the same flow assignment holds for all other areas.
Now consider two paths between node 0 and node M . One
traverses the single line (0,M)′ that carries y unit of power
flow. The other traverses M tie lines, M odd lines, and M−1
even lines; the power flow along even lines is in the opposite
direction. Thus, the total flow along this path is M(1− y) +
M(1 − y/2) − (M − 1)(y/2) = 2M − 2My + y/2. Thus,
by Observation 3.1, y = 2M − 2My + y/2 implying that
y = 2M(0.5+2M) .
Proof of Corollary 4.6: The proof follows by case
analysis. First, consider a failure event of a tie line. Since
there is no power flow along the tie line, such a failure does
not change the operations of the power grid and a capacity
of 0.5 along internal lines and 0 along tie lines suffices to
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Fig. 15. Illustration of the proof of Lemma 4.7. The graph Q4 has 4 paths
between its generation node and its demand node, two of length 2, one of
length 4, and one of length 8.
withstand such a failure.
On the other hand, Lemma 4.5 analyzes a single internal
line failures. In that case, as M goes to infinity, the post-
failure flow on an internal lines approaches 1. On the other
hand, the maximum post-failure flow on the tie lines is 1/9
when M = 2.
Proof of Lemma 4.7: For any m > 2, let Qm = 〈C∪D, E〉
be an undirected graph with a single supply node and a single
demand node, that are connected through m disjoint path in the
following manner: the first two paths are of length 2 (implying
that along each of these path there is an additional intermediate
neutral node, connected to the generator on one side and to
the demand node on the other side). For any i > 2, path i
is of length 2i+1. See Figure 15 depicting Q4. Assume also
that all lines have the same capacity u = 1/2 and the same
reactance x = 1. We note that the total number of lines in
Qm is 2m and the total number of nodes is 2m −m+ 2.
By Observation 3.1, the sum of flows along each of the
m path is the same, denoted by y. In addition, since there
is no generation or demand along each path and since each
intermediate node has degree 2, (1) immediately implies that
all lines along the same path carry the same amount of flow.
Namely, the flow along the lines of the first two path is y/2
and for each line of path i (i > 2) the flow is y/2i−1. Solving
(1) for the demand node, implies that y/2 +∑m−1i=1 y/2i = 1
and therefore y = 1
1.5− 1
2m−1
< 1 (for any m > 2). Since
the largest amount of flow on any line in the graph is y/2 <
1/2 = u, there power initially flow flawlessly.
Suppose now that there is a failure event in one of the lines
along the first path. Applying (1) on the intermediate node
implies that there is no flow along the other line of that path.
We next show that this failure event causes a cascade that last
m iterations, implying that cascades can be made arbitrarily
large (by choosing larger graph Qm).
After each iteration ℓ, denote by yℓ the total amount of flow
on each of the remaining path. We next show by induction
that the flow yℓ+1/2ℓ along each of the edges of the (ℓ+1)-th
path exceeds 1/2, implying that these lines fault in the next
iteration. In addition, for each j > ℓ + 1 the flow along all
lines of the j-th path is less than 1/2, implying that they still
operate at the end of the iteration.
In the base case, (1) for the demand node implies that∑m−1
i=1 y1/2
i = 1, and therefore y1 = 11− 1
2m−1
> 1, thus the
lines along the second path have power flow of y1/2 > 1/2
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Fig. 16. The effects of the number of initially faulted lines on the number
of faulted lines (left) and the number of components (right), after 5 rounds
of cascade for FoS K = 2.
and they fail. On the other hand, for any m > 2, y1 < 2, thus
all lines of path j > 2 has capacity of at most y1/4 < 1/2.
Suppose now that in iteration ℓ all lines of the first ℓ
paths fault. We show that iteration ℓ + 1 the lines of path
ℓ + 1, and the lines of the rest of the paths survive. The
proof follows by solving (1) for the demand node with the
surviving lines; namely,
∑m−1
i=ℓ
yℓ+1
2i = 1, implying that
yℓ+1 =
1
1
2ℓ−1
− 1
2m−1
= 2
m−1
2m−ℓ−1
. Thus, the flow on the lines of
the (ℓ + 1)-th path is yℓ+12ℓ =
1
2
2m−ℓ
2m−ℓ−1 >
1
2 , while the flow
on the lines of any path of index larger than ℓ + 1 is at most
yℓ+1
2ℓ+1 =
1
4
2m−ℓ
2m−ℓ−1 <
1
2 (for any ℓ < m).
Hence, the above cascade over Qm lasts for m iterations,
such that at each iteration the lines of one path fail. At the
end of the cascade, the demand and generation nodes are
disconnected and the yield is 0.
Cascades in an N -resilient grid with FoS K = 2:
Figure 17 shows the first five rounds of three failures, initiated
in three different locations. By comparing these results to the
cascade resulting from the same failures, but when the grid has
FoS K = 1.2 (Figure 3), one can clearly see than increasing
the FoS significantly slows down the cascade. These results
are further verified in Figure 16 which considers many failures
on that grid and shows the effects of the number of initially
faulted lines on the number of faulted lines after 5 rounds, as
well as the number of components.
0.696
(a) San Diego area failure event
0.788
(b) San Francisco area failure event
0.999
(c) Idaho-Montana-Wyoming border failure event
Fig. 17. Illustration of the cascading failures from Figure 3 for N -resilient
grid with FoS K = 2. The final yields are 0.696, 0.788, and 0.999.
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